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Abstract
We developed a new experimental design to test whether or not individuals engage in conflict between social groups
because they seek to harm outgroup members. Challenging prominent social psychological theories, we did not find
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Introduction
Contributing to the production of public goods is collectively
efficient but it is not individually rational. Scholars from various
academic disciplines are therefore puzzled by the high contribu-
tions to the production of collective goods that have been observed
in field research [1–3] as well as laboratory experiments [4,5].
Even more puzzling, however, are the high contribution rates that
have been found in intergroup-conflict games [6–9], a setting
where contributions are neither individually rational nor collec-
tively efficient. In this paper, we report results of two experiments
that were designed to test why individuals engage in intergroup
conflict.
In an intergroup-conflict setting, the population consists of
distinct social groups, each of which faces an intragroup collective
good problem. In addition, contributions to the collective good of
one’s group create negative externalities for the other group in that
they reduce the value of the collective good of the other group.
Typical examples of intergroup-conflict settings range from team
sports such as soccer, to TV talent shows where fans vote for
contestants, to competition for market share between organiza-
tions, to election campaigns in which political parties compete for
voters, to violent conflicts between nations. In each of these cases,
each individual (e.g., each player of a soccer team or each member
of a political party) has to decide how much to contribute to the
public good of her own group. Contributions produce benefit for
all group members but also entail considerable costs for the
contributor, rendering contribution individually irrational and
creating the intragroup collective-good problem. In addition,
contributions to the group’s public good decrease the welfare of
others outside the own group: the chances of winning for the
competing sports team become slimmer; the market shares of
other organizations decrease; the number of votes for the
competing political parties decreases; the number of enemy
casualties of war increases.
Obviously, rational egoists will not contribute to the collective
good of their group and, therefore, will not engage in intergroup
conflict. Nevertheless, everyday experience as well as experimental
research [6,7] demonstrates that populations composed of several
distinct groups can end up in very inefficient situations where
members of different subgroups contribute to the collective good
of their group but where these contributions harm outgroup
members to such an extent that all individuals are worse off than if
nobody had contributed in the first place.
Scholars debate which individual motives underlie contributions
in intergroup conflict situations. On the one hand, social-identity
theory [10] assumes that individuals seek to maximize status
differences between salient in- and outgroups [11,12]. Supporting
this notion, experimental research along the lines of the minimal-
group paradigm found that subjects prefer money allocations that
maximize payoff differences between groups even if this decreases
their individual payoff [13]. On the other hand, classical theories
of intergroup prejudice [15] and more recent theories of
intergroup categorization [16] hold that group membership
implies negative feelings towards a salient outgroup only under
very limited conditions. Instead, these approaches hold that not
‘‘outgroup hate’’ but ‘‘ingroup love’’ motivates contributions to
intergroup conflict. In other words, this view holds that individuals
may engage in conflict that implies substantive negative external-
ities for outgroup members mainly because they seek to support
the welfare of their fellow group members. In this view, the fact
that contributions to conflict harm the outgroup is a mere (perhaps
unfortunate) by-product.
Empirically identifying the motives that drive contributions to a
given intergroup conflict is an intricate problem [7,8], as high
contributions may result from positive social preferences towards
members of one’s group, but may also be motivated by the desire
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to harm members of the other group. Similarly, low contributions
may reflect purely selfish motives or an irenic seeking to avoid
harming the other group.
There is little empirical research on the motives that underlie
contributions to a given intergroup conflict. Halevy et al. [8]
presented an experimental design in which subjects who decided
to contribute to the collective good of their group had two options.
Either they contributed in a way that would not affect the payoffs
of outgroup members or in a way that would also decrease the
payoffs of the other group. It turned out that contributors hardly
chose the option that harmed outgroup members, providing first
support for the claim that subjects did not intend to decrease
payoffs of outgroup members. In a more elaborate experimental
design Abbink et al. [6] found contributions to the group public
good to be substantially above the Nash equilibrium prediction
(which was strictly positive in their design). Furthermore, the
authors reported that there were no significant effects of outgroup
past behavior on individuals’ contributions and conjectured that
‘‘subjects seem to focus more on the interaction with the other
team members than on that with the rival team, but at this point
one can only speculate whether this can be generalized and how
this is best explained’’ [6].
Further doubt on the outgroup-hate mechanism was cast by
recent psychological research [17] on the effects of oxytocin, a
peptide that is produced in the hypothalamus. It turned out that
subjects given oxytocin show increased ethnocentrism mainly
because of increased ingroup favoritism and to a much lesser
extent because of increased outgroup derogation.
Inspired by these empirical findings, we study in this contribu-
tion whether individual engagement in intergroup conflict is
motivated by negative social preferences towards the outgroup
(outgroup hate). To this end, we developed a simple formal model
of intergroup conflict that takes into account social preferences
towards in- and outgroup members. Analyzing the model, we
developed a new experimental design which allows drawing
conclusions about the nature of other-regarding preferences.
Results of two laboratory experiments that apply this experimental
design show that, in the setting of our experiment, contributions to
intergroup conflict were not motivated by outgroup hate, a finding
that challenges psychological theories of intergroup relations
[10,11].
The absence of outgroup hate, however, does not exclude that
individuals heavily engage in conflict with the other group,
decreasing their own as well as collective welfare. In contrast, as
conjectured by Abbink et al. [6], individuals may contribute to
conflict between groups as a result of a social process that acts
within their group even if they do not have negative social
preferences. This is a striking conjecture as it suggests that conflicts
between groups that we observe in real life may not always be
caused by negative intergroup relations but may, instead, be the
result of seemingly innocent social processes that act within the
groups.
In order to test this conjecture, we studied in the second
experiment whether intergroup conflict is fueled when we allow
subgroup members to engage in cheap-talk communication, a
social process that should not affect decisions by rational egoists
but that has been shown to increase contributions in public-good
experiments [7,18–20]. Using the new experimental design, we did
not find outgroup hate in the second experiment. Nevertheless,
subjects contributed on average 89 percent of their endowment to
intergroup conflict when they could send short messages to their
group members, an increase of 31 percent compared to the
condition without communication.
In addition, the second experiment was specifically designed to
test why communication increases contributions, a critical question
because communication comprises a multitude of social processes
[5] that need to be carefully disentangled in order to understand
communication effects. Recent economic models [21,23,24] suggest
that the statement of intentions during communication increases
contributions if subjects seek to avoid guilt, the psychological costs
that they perceive if they let others down who were influenced by
their stated intentions. Our results do not support that this
mechanism underlies the very strong increase in contributions that
results from communication. Instead, explorative analyses suggest
that communication increases intergroup conflict in our experiment
because subjects responded to positive reinforcement by their fellow
group members. This resembles the mechanism Coleman [26]
invokes to explain the occurrence of ‘excessive zeal’ in the
production of public goods. Expressions of encouragement and
gratitude (i.e., positive reinforcement) are dispensed at low costs but
may be highly valued by the receiver, spurring him on to yet greater
contributions.
Experimental Method
The main purpose of this study was to test whether intergroup
settings lead to positive or negative social preferences regarding
outgroup members and whether high engagement in intergroup
conflict is possible even in the absence of outgroup hate. To this
end, we present in the following a game-theoretic model of
intergroup settings that takes into account social preferences
regarding members of both individuals’ ingroups and outgroups.
Based on this model, we identified two experimental conditions
which can be compared in order to draw conclusions about the
nature of preferences regarding outgroup members.
Two central features characterize intergroup settings. First,
individuals are members of one of two distinct social groups of G
members. Members of each group face an intragroup public-good
problem. In our model of intergroup settings, players simulta-
neously decide how many money units xi, of an initial endowment
of 10 money units, to contribute to the group public good. Player







where j identifies the G ingroup members only. In our
experimental studies, we focused on groups of three actors
(G~3) and assigned the value two to the efficiency factor e
(e~2) in order to simplify calculations for subjects.
Second, in intergroup settings individual contributions to one’s
group’s public good also affect the material value of the public good of
the respective outgroup to a degree that is described by parameter a.
This intergroup relationship is reciprocal. Player i’s material payoff pi
as a function of ingroup (xi) and outgroup (x
0
k) contributions is then
summarized in Equation 2, where j again identifies the ingroup














If parameter a adopts the value zero, then each group separately
plays a standard public good game (standard PGG). In the
experiments, we compare contributions under two conditions. In
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the first condition, denoted ‘‘Conflict’’, parameter a adopts the
value 21.5. This implements that a contribution of one money
unit to the public good of one’s group decreases the value of the
public good of the respective other group by 1.5 money units. This
value of a implies that there is global inefficiency when all subjects
contribute at the same level in Conflict: through the losses imposed
by the other group, all members of both groups are worse off than
if they had kept their endowment of 10 money units and
contributed nothing. Figure 1 illustrates the game structure of the
Conflict condition. This figure was also used in the instructions of
the experiments.
The second condition is characterized by a~1:5 and will be
referred to as ‘‘Harmony’’. Under this condition, each contributed
money unit implies an increase in the value of the outgroup’s
public good by 1.5 money units. Note that since the outgroup
consists of 3 players, the impact on each individual outgroup
member is + 1
2
. In the remainder of this section, we demonstrate
that a comparison of contributions in these two conditions allows
conclusions about individual preferences towards outgroup mem-
bers.
Modeling individual contribution decisions, we assumed a
simple linear ‘altruism model’ where the altruism parameters may
adopt different values for members of different groups and are
allowed to be negative. To be more precise, individual i’s utility is
linear in money, and is a weighted sum of own material payoffs













A player’s utility function thus has two social preference
parameters a and b. Parameter a represents the evaluation of
payoffs that members of one’s ingroup receive and b models the
evaluation of outgroup members’ payoffs. Positive parameter
values imply that individuals derive a positive utility from each
money unit that in- or outgroup members earn, incorporating the
psychological concept of ‘‘ingroup love’’[16]. Negative values, on
the other hand, imply that individuals are unhappy if members of
the respective group make profit. This corresponds to what is
referred to as ‘‘outgroup hate’’ in psychology [16]. We presume
that players exhibit (weak) ingroup favoritism in the sense that they
value payoffs of ingroup members at least as highly as outgroup
payoffs (1wa§b). In addition, since a and b are both below 1,
players are assumed to be selfish to some extent: giving a dollar to
someone else strictly decreases their utility.
In the following, we first focus on model predictions for a one-
shot stage game under Harmony and Conflict. Subsequently, we
turn to infinitely repeated games and compare the ‘trigger strategy’
Figure 1. Illustration of the Game Structure in the Conflict condition that was used in the experiments.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0097848.g001
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Nash equilibria as functions of the players’ social preferences for
ingroup and outgroup members.
The Stage Game
Given the game and the assumptions outlined above, we can
analyze the one-shot stage game. In Harmony, the marginal utility




















is of course possible to make contributing individually rational by
making a and b large enough. However, this would amount to







in the stage game is the unique dominant strategy in both
Harmony and Conflict. In the following we will therefore assume
that the parameters are bounded in this way, which gives us a
unique equilibrium in the stage game where every player
contributes nothing and earns a material payoff of 10. For each
player i the associated utility is:
ui~10z20az30b: ð4Þ
The Infinitely Repeated Game
Repeating the stage game indefinitely allows for the existence of
Nash equilibria other than the ‘no contribution’ strategy profile in
the one-shot stage game. Throughout we assume that players
discount future payoffs by a constant discount parameter d[(0,1)
and focus on two different symmetric trigger strategy profiles [25].
We look for symmetric strategies since in the experiment the
subjects have perfectly symmetrical roles. Obviously, there can be
many asymmetric equilibria, but since all subjects occupy an
equivalent position, there is no a priori reason to assume that an
asymmetric equilibrium will be played. We focus on trigger
strategy equilibria first of all because they are subgame perfect,
given that not contributing anything is an equilibrium in the stage
game. Secondly, in a mathematically tractable and stylized way
the trigger strategies embody the notion that a player might
attempt high levels of contributions in the beginning of the game,
after which she decreases her contributions because of disappoint-
ing contributions by others.
First consider the contribution profile where all players across
both groups contribute a nonzero part of the endowment (yw0),
and the following symmetric (trigger) strategy profile: ‘‘Contribute
y in every round as long as no player has deviated (Contribution
Phase). When a single player has deviated, contribute nothing
forever after (Punishment Phase).’’ We investigate whether this
strategy profile can be an equilibrium.
















in Harmony and Conflict, respectively. In both Harmony and
Conflict the utilities in each round of the Punishment Phase
(upunish) are equal to equation (4). In Conflict we now have
uConflict,contributionvupunish for any yw0. Thus, a symmetric
contribution profile across both groups, with strictly positive
contributions cannot be an equilibrium under these trigger
strategies in Conflict. However, numerous experimental studies
found substantial contributions in intergroup-conflict settings
[6,7]. Therefore, we look for a symmetric equilibrium trigger
strategy profile that allows for strictly positive contributions in
Conflict.
Consider the contribution profile where all players who belong
to the ingroup contribute yw0, and the following ingroup
symmetric trigger strategy profile: ‘Contribute y in every round
as long as no ingroup member has deviated (Contribution Phase).
When a single ingroup member has deviated, contribute nothing
forever after (Punishment Phase).’ According to this profile,
although players still care about the payoffs of outgroup members
(i.e., we have made no changes in the utilities, but only in the
strategies), their strategies are based on behavior within their own
groups only: only deviations by ingroup members are punished.
Note that this strategy profile chimes with the previously cited
observation of Abbink [6] that subjects focus more on the
interaction with fellow team members than on interactions with
the rival team. In addition, the data from the experiment allows us
to evaluate the validity of this assumption (see section II.C). In the
following, we investigate whether this strategy profile can be an
equilibrium.
Let x denote the average contribution in the other group. Then














The maximum utility a player can get in a single round by
deviating is obtained when she contributes nothing to the group
public good, while her fellow ingroup members continue

























It is easy to show that the ingroup symmetric trigger strategy
profile is a Nash equilibrium of the infinitely repeated game









Equation 10 shows that the equilibrium threshold (i) is
independent of both y and x, and (ii) decreases in both a and b.
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Performing the same analysis for Conflict, we find that the












































, conforming to the ingroup symmetric
trigger strategy profile is better than being punished, in Conflict.
The ingroup trigger strategies form an equilibrium in Conflict









Equation 14 shows that the equilibrium threshold (i) is
independent of both y and x, (ii) decreases in a, and (iii) increases
in b.
The equilibrium analysis of the ingroup symmetric trigger
strategy profile thus yields two threshold values for the discount
parameter, h(Harmony) and h(Conflict). Comparing equations
10 and 14 shows that h(Hamony)ƒh(Conflict) for any pair
f(a,b)Da,b§0g. In fact, it is easy to show that





, this is true only if bv0.
Summarizing the theoretical results for our experimental games,
we have found an ingroup symmetric strategy profile that allows
strictly positive contributions in both Harmony and Conflict, while
not contributing anything is the unique dominant strategy in the
one-shot stage game. In addition, under the current model and
equilibrium profile we can formulate the following corollary. This
conclusion is valid even if ingroup social preferences (a) are





Corollary: The discount parameter threshold is higher in Harmony than
in Conflict if and only if players have strictly negative social
preferences for the material payoff of the outgroup. Therefore,
if we observe in the experiment higher average contributions in
the Conflict condition than in the Harmony condition, we
can conclude that participants have strictly negative social
preferences towards the members of the outgroup.
In our experimental study we draw a simple random sample of
participants. Therefore, there are no differences in the expected
distributions of the discount parameter between the Harmony and
the Conflict condition. This implies that the likelihood of any
within-group contribution level y (see the equilibrium strategy
profile above) being supportable in equilibrium is higher in Conflict
than in Harmony if and only if b is negative; i.e., if and only if
players have strictly negative social preferences for the material
payoffs of the outgroup. Since the equilibrium profile does not
specify a particular contribution level y, there is the problem of a
multiplicity of equilibria. However, again by the fact that we draw a
simple random sample of participants there are no expected
differences in the particular equilibrium level y, between Harmony
and Conflict. Thus, observed average contributions are higher in
Conflict than in Harmony if and only if participants have strictly
negative social preferences for the material payoffs of the outgroup.
In behavioral terms this means the following. We first of all
assume that players condition their contributions only on the
contributions made by their fellow ingroup members, not on those
made by outgroup members. Secondly, players are assumed to
have a time preference, embodied in their discount parameter. We
then showed that the critical discount parameter threshold that
makes nonzero contributions sustainable in equilibrium is smaller
in Harmony than in Conflict, unless players negatively value
payoffs for outgroup members. In other words, any contribution
level that can be sustained in equilibrium in Conflict, can be
sustained in Harmony, but the reverse is not true. Thus, under the
current model, contributions in Conflict will be larger than those
in Harmony only in the presence of ‘‘outgroup hate’’. Thus,
comparing empirical contributions in Harmony and Conflict
allows drawing conclusions about whether contributions are
motivated by negative social preferences towards outgroup
members.
Two potentially problematic aspects of the model were taken
into account in the design of the experiment. First, in order to be
able to apply the infinite horizon model to a laboratory setting
where subjects play a fixed number of periods, we did not inform
subjects about the number of periods they were playing. Second,
the model is based on an ‘ingroup trigger strategy’, in which only
an ingroup contribution level y is specified in the Contribution
Phase, and only ingroup deviations from this contribution level are
punished. In order to be able to test to which degree subjects
furthermore took into account outgroup behavior, subjects guessed
contributions of their fellow ingroup members and of members of
the outgroup after making their own contribution decisions.
Subjects received extra payoff for guesses that were close to the
actual contributions.
We make the following observation concerning the comparison
of our experimental design with that of Halevy et al.[8], which has
been described in the previous section. Notwithstanding the fact
that the design of Halevy et al. is an excellent device to study the
theoretical issue of purely negative outgroup preferences, partic-
ipants’ behavior in their design is susceptible of social desirability.
Making a contribution that harms the other group, when another
option that benefits the ingroup equally but does not harm the
outgroup is available, demonstrates negative feelings towards
members of the outgroup and may be normatively very much
disapproved of. Even spiteful individuals that positively hate the
outgroup might refrain from this course of action because of social
desirability concerns. In our current experimental design this is
much less of an issue, since contributions to the group public good
can easily be justified by the desire to help the ingroup. We note
that this is true for the vast majority of real-life intergroup conflicts.
Comparing our design with that of Abbink et al.[6] two
important differences attract attention. First of all, in their design
individual contributions by egoists can be rational in the stage
game, depending on the beliefs about the behaviors of others. In
our design however, contributing is never egoistically rational, no
matter the (expected) behaviors of others. Our design thus implies
Do Intergroup Conflicts Necessarily Result from Outgroup Hate?
PLOS ONE | www.plosone.org 5 June 2014 | Volume 9 | Issue 6 | e97848
a clearer benchmark of rational egoistic behavior. Positive
contributions are therefore a clear indication of social preferences.
Secondly, in the Abbink et al. design teams compete for a prize,
but do not positively harm each other in the competition. In other
words, a team can entirely cut its losses by simply not participating
in the competition for the prize. In our design, however, a group of
players directly harms the other group when producing its own
public good. This is a rather subtle difference that merits further
experimental investigation [7].
Ethics Statement
Both experiments were conducted at the Sociological Labora-
tory of the Department of Sociology at the University of
Groningen in the Netherlands. Subjects were recruited from the
subject pool of the Department of Sociology, which comprises
mainly students and alumni from the two universities in
Groningen. Volunteers registered for experimental sessions, using
an online form [27]. Sessions were randomly assigned to
conditions. All experiments were implemented in z-tree [28].
The recruitment and the experiment complied with the ethical
guidelines set out by the Sociological Laboratory of the
Department of Sociology at the University of Groningen
(http://www.gmw.rug.nl/,orsee/public/privacy.php) and were
approved by the Review Board of the Sociological Laboratory.
Written informed consent was obtained from each participant
before conducting the experiment. During the experiment subjects
were made aware of the fact the experiment did not involve
deception of any form.
Experiments
Experiment 1: Ingroup Love and Outgroup Hate
The aim of the first experiment was to empirically test whether
or not negative social preferences towards outgroup members
motivate contributions to intergroup conflict, applying the new
experimental design. The experiment consisted of two sets of
treatments. In the first set, subjects were assigned to one of two
treatments, allowing a within and between subjects comparison
between the Harmony and the Conflict condition. In the ‘‘first
Conflict, then Harmony treatment’’, subjects first made 10
decisions under the Conflict condition (a~{1:5) and continued
with 10 decisions in the Harmony condition (a~1:5). In the ‘‘first
Harmony, then Conflict treatment’’ subjects also made 10
decisions under each condition but in the reversed order.
The second treatment set of the experiment provided two
baseline conditions. In the first baseline condition, contributions to
the public good of a group had no effect on the other group (a~0).
However, the remaining features of this treatment were identical
to the Harmony and the Conflict condition. In particular, subjects
were informed about the contributions to the public good of the
other group. In the second baseline condition, subjects played a
standard public good game in a group of three. In other words,
subjects were not informed about contributions of another group
in this condition. Below, we refer to this latter condition as the
‘‘standard public good game’’ (PGG). The purpose of the baseline
conditions was to test whether or not differences between
contributions in the Harmony and the Conflict condition might
result from additional social preferences. For instance, higher
average contributions in Harmony than in Conflict might result
from positive social preferences towards outgroup members. In
this case, one would observe higher contributions in the Harmony
condition than in the baseline conditions, as subjects can increase
the payoffs of outgroup members in the Harmony condition. We
included the baseline conditions to test this hypothesis.
Table 1 summarizes the experimental manipulations of
Experiment 1. In both baseline treatments, subjects played 20
periods under the same condition. However, since subjects in the
baseline treatments never experienced a switch in the experimen-
tal conditions, we analyzed only the first 10 periods of the baseline
treatments. Only these periods can be compared to the first ten
periods of the first treatment set in a between-subjects design.
Procedures. For each of the four treatments, we scheduled
four experimental sessions with 12 subjects each. There were two
societies in each session and each society consisted of two
subgroups of three members (see Figure 1). Group memberships
were anonymous and constant across all periods. We excluded
those sessions from the analyses where too few subjects showed up
to create two societies. Altogether, 36 subjects participated in the
‘‘first Conflict, then Harmony’’ treatment and 48 subjects
participated in the treatment with the reversed order. There were
36 participants in standard PGG and 48 subjects played the PGG
with information about other group (a~0).
This was the first experiment on intergroup games that had
been conducted with members of this subject pool. We therefore
expected that subjects did not have experiences with this type of
experiment. The experiment was conducted in English language,
in order to make sure that both Dutch and foreign participants
had an equal understanding of the instructions.
Sessions began with general verbal instructions. Next, subjects
read detailed instructions on the computer screens, receiving all
instructions that concerned the public good game of their own
group. In the conditions where subjects were informed about their
outgroup, subjects read on the next screen that there was a second
group and how this group affected their payoffs. Next, subjects
interacted in 20 periods. In the first treatment set (Harmony and
Conflict), subjects read after the tenth period how the rules of the
game were about to be changed and then continued in the
respective other condition. Subjects were not informed about the
number of periods that they played in each condition.
Each interaction period consisted of four steps. First, subjects
received 10 points (each worth 2 Euro cents) and decided how
many points they would like to contribute. In order to assess
subjects’ expectations about the contributions of their group
members, subjects were asked in the second step to guess how
many points the other two members of their own group had just
contributed on average. In order to increase the validity of this
measure [29], we informed subjects that they would receive 10
extra points at the end of the experiment for each guess that
differed not more than 2 points from the real value. In the
conditions where subjects were informed about an outgroup,
subjects also guessed the average contribution of the outgroup
members and also received 10 extra points for accurate guessing.
A potential disadvantage of this method of belief elicitation is that
subjects might hedge their stated guesses against the outcomes of
the intergroup game [30]. We can not exclude that this was the
case in the first experiment. In the second experiment, however,
we refrained from including belief elicitation methods and could
replicate the main findings of the first study. In the third step of an
interaction period, subjects were informed about the average
contributions of their group members and their outgroup (if there
was one) and how many points they had just earned. Finally,
subjects read whether they had earned extra points with good
guessing.
Figures S1, S2, and S3 in File S1, show screenshots of the main
stages of the experiment including the instructions.
Treatment effects. Figure 2 informs about the average
contributions in the Harmony and Conflict condition, revealing
that on average subjects contributed more points in the Harmony
Do Intergroup Conflicts Necessarily Result from Outgroup Hate?
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condition than in the Conflict condition. This was found in the
‘‘first Conflict, then Harmony treatment’’ and the ‘‘first Harmony,
then Conflict treatment’’. To test whether this difference between
the two conditions was statistically significant with a method that
takes into account that decisions are nested in subjects and
subgroups, we estimated linear multilevel mixed-effects regression
models [31], the statistical approach that we used throughout the
article. Results are summarized in Table 2. A comparison of
empty models with the likelihood ratio test revealed that
additionally considering the nestedness in societies did not improve
model fit significantly, indicating that the differences between
societies were small (deviance = 2.17). The ‘‘final model’’ of
Table 2 shows that in the Conflict condition subjects contributed
on average 5.53 points. In the Harmony condition, subjects
contributed 0.78 points more on average. This effect is statistically
significant. Furthermore, a likelihood ratio test comparing the
empty model with the final model showed that including the
dummy variable for the Harmony condition significantly increased
model fit (pv0:001). There was no significant main effect of the
ordering condition (see variable ‘‘First Harmony the Conflict’’).
Also the interaction effect of the ordering treatment and the
Harmony condition was insignificant, showing that the ordering of
the Harmony and the Conflict condition did not affect contribu-
tions significantly. Likewise, likelihood ratio tests showed the fit of
the model with the main effects (p~0:92) and the full model
(p~0:25) was not significantly better than the fit of the final model.
Figure 3 pictures differences between contributions in the two
baseline conditions (a~0) and in Harmony (a~1:5) and Conflict
(a~{1:5). The corresponding statistical tests are reported in
Table 3. This figure and the results in the table are based on the
first 10 decisions. The differences between the two baseline
conditions appear to be small and were not statistically significant.
Furthermore, it turned out that subjects contributed on average
0.79 points less in the Harmony condition than in the standard
public good game. This difference turned out to be insignificant.
However, subjects in the Conflict condition contributed signifi-
cantly fewer points than those subjects who played standard public
good games. To be more precise, subjects contributed on average
1.55 less in the Conflict condition. A likelihood ratio test showed
that fit of the full model in Table 3 is not significantly higher than
the fit of the empty model (p~0:378).
In sum, we found that subjects contributed significantly more in
the Harmony than in the Conflict condition. According to the
Corollary we can, thus, conclude that Experiment 1 did not
provide evidence for negative social preferences towards the
members of the outgroup. Likewise, the comparison with the
baseline conditions did not provide evidence for positive social
preferences towards members of the outgroup.
Effects of the expectations. Table 4 informs about whether
subjects’ contribution decisions were influenced by their expecta-
tions about the contributions of their fellow ingroup members and
the members of the other group. A positive statistical effect of the
expected contribution of ingroup members on subjects’ own
contributions would reveal that subjects contributed more points
when they expected their ingroup members to contribute many
points, supporting that subjects had social preferences. Similarly, a
positive effect of expected contribution of outgroup members in
the Harmony condition would support that subjects sought to have
similar payoffs as the members of their respective outgroup. Thus,
this analysis allows us to evaluate the validity of our modeling
assumption that subjects condition their own contributions on the
contributions of their ingroup only.
If, contrary to our assumption, subjects in the Conflict condition
sought to increase payoff differences between their ingroup and
members of the outgroup as social psychological theories suggest
[10], one would expect that subjects contributed more points
themselves when they expected outgroup members to contribute
many points. This is because contributions of outgroup members
increase the average payoff of outgroup members and, in addition,
decrease the payoffs of ingroup members. Thus, if subjects sought
to achieve a favorable comparison for their own group, they would
respond with higher contributions to high expected contributions
of outgroup members, because own contributions would increase
payoffs of ingroup members and decrease payoffs of outgroup
members. In the statistical model, such conditioning of contribu-
tions on the outgroup would be supported by a positive effect of
expected contribution of outgroup members on subjects’ own
contributions.
All analyses in Table 4 are based only on the first ten periods in
the three treatments where there was an outgroup. The decision in
the remaining periods were excluded because in the treatment
where the two groups did not affect each other (a~0) there was no
change of experimental conditions after the tenth period. As a
consequence only decision during the first ten periods can be
compared. The table reports a separate model for each of the
three conditions. Likelihood ratio tests revealed that controlling for
the nestedness of decisions in subjects increased model fit
significantly. However, taking into account the nestedness in
subgroups and societies did not increase model fit.
We found that in all three conditions contributions were
significantly influenced by the expectations about ingroup
members’ contributions. In other words, subjects contributed










1 1 first Conflict (a~{1:5), yes 36
then Harmony (a~1:5)
2 first Harmony (a~1:5), yes 48
then Conflict ({a~1:5)
3 2 20 rounds of Public yes 48
Good game (a~0)
4 20 rounds of Public no 36
Good game (a~0)
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0097848.t001
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Table 2. Treatment effects on contributions.
Dependent variable: Contribution
Empty model Main effects Full model Final model
Fixed part
Constant 5.92*** 5. 55*** 5.38*** 5.53***
(0.35) (0.54) (0.56) (0.36)
Harmony 78*** 95*** 78***
condition (0.13) (0.19) (0.13)
First Harmony 20.04 0.11




Between 2.87 2.87 2.87 2.87
subgroup var. (0.94) (0.94) (0.94) (0.94)
Between 1.52 1.53 1.53 1.53
subject var. (0.35) (0.35) (0.35) (0.35)
Residual 6.97 6.81 6.81 6.81
variance (0.25) (0.24) (0.24) (0.24)
22 loglikelihood 8218.83 8181.95 8180.60 8181.95
Number of subjects 84 84 84 84
Number of decisions 1680 1680 1680 1680
Standard errors in parentheses.
***significantly different from 0 at the 1 percent level (twosided Wald-test).
**significantly different from 0 at the 5 percent level (twosided Wald-test).
*significantly different from 0 at the 10 percent level (twosided Wald-test).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0097848.t002
Figure 2. In Harmony contributions were higher than in Conflict, independent of the ordering treatment.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0097848.g002
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Table 3. Comparison with standard public goods game.
Dependent variable: Contribution
Empty model Full model
Fixed part
Constant (mean std. 6.33*** 7.02***
PGG in full model) (0.31) (0.64)
a = 0 (PGG with 20.44
two groups) (0.85)
Harmony (a = 1.5) 20.79
(0.85)
Conflict (a =21.5) 21.55*
(0.91)
Random part
between subgroup 4.38 4.09
variance (0.99) (0.94)
between subject 2.15 2.15
variance (0.35) (0.35)
Residual variance 4.38 4.38
(0.16) (0.16)
22 loglikelihood 7648.05 7644.96
Number of subjects 168 168
Number of decisions 1680 1680
Standard errors in parentheses.
***significantly different from 0 at the 1 percent level (twosided Wald-test).
**significantly different from 0 at the 5 percent level (twosided Wald-test).
*significantly different from 0 at the 10 percent level (twosided Wald-test).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0097848.t003
Figure 3. In the baseline conditions contributions were higher than in Conflict.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0097848.g003
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more points when they expected their group members to
contribute many points. In a model (not shown here) of the data
from all three conditions we did not find significant differences in
the effect size of ingroup expectations.
Importantly, this effect was not found for the expectations
concerning the outgroup. In neither of the three conditions, did
subjects contribute more or less depending on their expectations
concerning the contributions made by the outgroup. This is most
surprising for the Harmony condition, because contributions of
both in- and outgroup members increased subjects’ own payoffs.
Nevertheless, categorizing subjects into two groups appeared to
have affected subjects’ decisions in the sense that they paid
attention only to ingroup contributions when making their own
contribution decisions [12]. This supports the modeling assump-
tion we made and contradicts the social psychological notion that
subjects seek to increase payoff differences between their ingroup
and members of the outgroup.
In a nutshell, we found contributions in the Harmony condition
to be significantly higher than in the Conflict condition.
Furthermore, contributions in both Harmony and Conflict turned
out to be lower than in the baseline conditions, suggesting that the
difference between contributions in Harmony and Conflict were
not caused by additional incentives to contribute in Harmony.
Finally, we found support for our assumption that subjects based
their own decisions on expected contributions by ingroup
members only. On the whole, these findings do not provide any
evidence for negative social preferences towards the outgroup. In
other words, in the setting of this experiment, we did not find
support for the outgroup-hate argument. Furthermore, the results
suggest that subjects did not seek to increase outgroup members’
payoffs. However, subjects refrained from engaging in behavior
that would harm outgroup members, which explains why we
found higher contributions in the Harmony conditions than in the
Conflict condition.
Experiment 2: Intragroup Processes
Results of Experiment 1 did not provide support for the
outgroup-hate argument, suggesting that in the setting of this
experiment subjects did not seek to increases payoff differences
between members of their own group and the outgroup.
Nevertheless, we found high contributions in the Conflict
condition (5.53 points on average, see Table 2). The purpose of
Experiment 2 was to test whether an intragroup process can
increase contributions and intensify intergroup conflict. In other
words, we sought to test whether or not individuals who do not
seek to harm members of an outgroup may nevertheless be
motivated to heavily engage in intergroup conflict as a result of a
process that acts within their own group. Abbink et al.[6] provided
recent evidence that this may be possible, conducting an
intergroup-conflict experiment where subjects were given the
opportunity to punish their ingroup members. It turned out that
contributions were significantly higher than in a condition without
the opportunity to punish. The experimental design of Abbink et
al. does not allow to draw conclusions about the impact of
outgroup hate. However, their results suggest that subjects fueled
intergroup conflict not because they sought to harm the outgroup
but because they sought to prevent being punished by their group
members for not contributing to the collective good of their own
group.
We focused in our second experiment on an alternative
intragroup process, communication between group members.
Many experimental studies conducted by social psychologists have
demonstrated that communication has a striking potential to
increase cooperation in collective-good dilemma games [19].
Recent findings from the economics literature support this finding








Constant 0.99** 0.96** 0.06
(0.50) (0.45) (0.52)
Expected contribution 0.80*** 0.84*** 0.89***
ingroup members (0.06) (0.07) (0.07)
Expected contribution 0.08 0.03 0.08
outgroup members (0.05) (0.07) (0.08)
Random part
between subject 2.80 2.96 1.53
variance (0.62) (0.66) (0.35)
Residual variance 2.29 2.70 6.81
(0.16) (0.18) (0.24)
22 loglikelihood 1883.59 1957.44 1620.05
Number of subjects 48 48 36
Number of decisions 480 480 360
Standard errors in parentheses.
***significantly different from 0 at the 1 percent level (twosided Wald-test).
**significantly different from 0 at the 5 percent level (twosided Wald-test).
*significantly different from 0 at the 10 percent level (twosided Wald-test).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0097848.t004
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[20]. In addition, the research group formed around Gary
Bornstein [8,32] conducted numerous intergroup-conflict exper-
iments where subjects communicated with the members of their
group before making individual decisions and found communica-
tion to increase contributions to conflict substantially.
The evidence that psychological research provided for the
effects of communication on contributions is impressive. However,
in the majority of communication experiments subjects met in a
separate room and openly discussed the decision problem before
they decided about their actual contributions. This communica-
tion process is extremely complex, creating a black box [5] that
makes it very difficult to extract the core mechanisms that are
responsible for the effect of communication on contributions.
Identifying these core mechanisms, on the other hand, is a critical
step in the development of an informative model of decision
making and communication in intergroup games.
Recently, economists developed rigorous models of communi-
cation in games, focusing on the statement of intentions during
communication [21,23,24]. According to the conventional game-
theoretic framework, stating one’s intentions in an intergroup-
conflict game is cheap talk [18] and should therefore fail to affect
contributions. The reason is simple. Players profit from contribu-
tions of their group members independent of their own
contributions. Thus, if there is only a slight chance that group
members positively respond to stating high intentions, even players
who do not plan to cooperate will pretend to contribute. It follows
that others’ stated intentions to contribute do not inform about
their actual intentions and should therefore fail to affect
contribution decisions. On the other hand, empirical studies
support that cheap talk increases contributions to collective goods.
For instance, Duffy[33] conducted one-shot prisoner-dilemma
games where subjects were either informed about the decision of
their current interaction partner in the previous period or received
a message from this player where she stated her intentions.
Strikingly, contribution rates did not differ significantly between
the two conditions but where significantly higher than in a control
condition where no additional information was provided.
The effects of communicating intentions on contributions has
been attributed to guilt aversion, the tendency to avoid the
psychological costs of letting others down [21,23,24]. In a nutshell,
it has been argued that individuals will stick to their stated
intentions even when it is cheap talk because they would feel guilty
if they contributed less than their group members expect them to
contribute based on their stated intentions [22,34–36]. With
regard to intergroup-conflict settings, one would expect that the
opportunity to inform group members about one’s intentions
increases actual contributions if two assumptions are met. First,
individuals tend to promise contributing more than they actually
intend, e.g. in order to convince other group members to increase
their contributions. Second, individuals tend to contribute in
accordance with their stated intentions, because of guilt aversion.
In Experiment 2, we studied three communication conditions.
First, there was a control condition without communication.
Second, in the ‘‘standardized-messages condition’’, subjects
informed their group members about their intentions before they
entered their actual decision. The purpose of including this
condition was to test whether informing group members about
one’s intentions and being informed about their intentions does
indeed increase contributions, as the guilt-aversion argument
suggests.
However, the communication of intentions is only one aspect of
communication and it is questionable whether it is the crucial
aspect that is responsible for the overall effect of communication
on contributions. We therefore added a third condition where
communication was not restricted to informing each other about
intentions. However, we refrained from allowing the open face-to-
face pregame discussions which many psychological experiments
are based on [19]. Instead, we gave subjects the opportunity to
send a short message (140 characters) to their group members.
Accordingly, this condition is called the ‘‘short-message condi-
tion’’. In this condition, subjects had the opportunity to state their
intentions (like in the standardized-messages condition). However,
they could also formulate expectations in the sense of articulating a
social norm of how many points their group members should
contribute. Furthermore, subjects could react to each others’
previous contributions, endorsing or criticizing their previous
decisions. Finally, the transmission of short messages made it
possible to communicate rather detailed arguments about why one
should contribute or not.
Thus, communication in the condition with short messages was
rather complex. However, the communication of short messages
excludes nonverbal communication which is very difficult to
measure or control experimentally [5]. Another advantage of short
messages is that they can be saved, allowing us to analyze the
content of the messages and explore in more detail why
communication may increase contributions.
To our knowledge, there is very little research on intergroup
games that involved communication and tested for negative social
preferences towards outgroups [8]. We therefore conducted for
each communication condition separate Harmony and Conflict
treatments, applying the same method as in the first experiment.
Altogether there were two (Harmony vs. Conflict) times three (no
communication vs. standardized messages vs. short messages)
treatments.
Procedures. For each of the six treatments, we conducted
two sessions with 12 subjects each. In total, 144 subjects
participated in this experiment. Experimental sessions were
randomly assigned to the six treatments. Nineteen participants
(13.2 percent) of Experiment 2 had participated earlier in
Experiment 1 and were, thus, familiar with intergroup games.
The other participants had never taken part in an experiment with
an intergroup game before. Subjects were free to subscribe to any
session in which they wanted to participate. By chance this
produced a pattern in which the 19 subjects that had participated
in Experiment 1 were evenly distributed over the six experimental
treatments of Experiment 2.
The design of this experiment was similar to the design of the
first experiment. There were, however, three main differences.
First, in order to keep the duration of experimental sessions below
30 minutes, subjects made only ten decisions instead of twenty.
For the same reason, subjects did not enter their expectations
concerning the contributions of other participants. Finally, the
experiment was conducted in Dutch language, in order to make
sure that subjects could formulate and understand the short
messages. In the invitation e-mails that were sent to the members
of the subject pool, we made explicit that the experiment was to be
conducted in Dutch.
In the treatments without communication, each interaction
period consisted of two steps. First, subjects entered their
contribution and, second, subjects were informed about the
individual decisions of their ingroup’s members and the sum of
contributions of the other group.
In the conditions with communication, interaction periods also
consisted of these two steps. However, there were two additional
steps at the beginning of each period. In the standardized-message
conditions, subjects were first asked to send a message to their
fellow group members by completing the following sentence: ‘‘I
will contribute . . . points to the group project.’’ Second, subjects
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read the messages that their respective group members had sent in
the previous step. In the third step, subjects entered their actual
contributions. Finally, subjects were informed about others’
decisions. In the short-message condition, subjects first entered
an up to 140 characters long message and, second, read the
messages of their group members. Next, subjects entered their
actual contribution and were informed about the outcomes of the
game.
Treatment effects. The core results of the second experi-
ment are summarized in Figure 4, which depicts average
contributions for each of the six conditions. Random-intercept
models that tested the differences between conditions are reported
in Table 5.
The first important result is that in all three communication
conditions contributions were significantly higher in the Harmony
condition than in the Conflict condition. On average, subjects
contributed 0.84 points more in Harmony than in Conflict. The
‘‘Full model’’ in Table 5 shows that the differences between
contributions in Harmony and Conflict did not differ between the
three communication conditions (see the insignificant interaction
terms). In sum, this replicates the finding of the first experiment
that subjects did not have negative social preferences towards the
members of the other group.
In the light of this finding, the very high contributions in the
condition where subjects communicated short messages are
remarkable. In the Conflict condition with short messages, subjects
contributed on average 8.93 of the 10 points that they received in
each period. Thus, even though there is no evidence for outgroup
hate, subjects contributed most of their points and, thus, fueled the
intergroup conflict.
Comparing contributions in the Conflict treatments without
communication and the Conflict treatment with short-messages
reveals that the very high contributions in the Conflict condition
with short messages were caused by the communication. To be
more precise, subjects contributed on average 3.05 points more
when they could transmit short messages. This supports the claim
that intergroup conflicts do not always result from negative feelings
towards the outgroup but can be the result of an intragroup
process.
Figure 4 shows that also in the treatments where standardized
messages were transmitted, contributions where higher than in the
treatments without communication. However, this difference
turned out to be insignificant (see model with ‘‘Main effects’’
and ‘‘Full model’’ in Table 5). Thus, stating intentions and reading
the intentions of the other subgroup members did not increase
contributions significantly. This does not support the hypothesis
that communication increases contributions because it increases
subjects’ expectations about the contributions of the other group
members. The Full model reveals that there is no indication of an
interaction effect between the Harmony treatment and the
communication treatments. Comparing the fit of the full model
with the fit of the main-effects model showed that including the
interaction effects did not improve model fit (p~0:95). The model
with the main effects, however, has a significantly better fit than
the empty model (pv0:001).
Analysis of standardized messages. Why did the commu-
nication of intentions fail to significantly increase contributions?
We did find that subjects’ decisions were correlated to their own
stated intentions and those of the other group members. For the
conditions where subjects transmitted standardized messages,
Figure 5 shows the development of average contributions, subjects’
average intentions and the average intentions of the group
members with the higher (see the upper border of the gray area)
and the lower (see the lower border of the gray area) intention.
The figure shows that in the Harmony as well as in the Conflict
condition subjects contributed according to their stated intentions
only at the very beginning of the experiment. In fact, over time
average actual contributions even dropped below the average
intention of the group member with the lower intention.
Table 6 informs about the degree to which contributions were
influenced by subjects’ own stated intentions and the intentions of
their subgroup members. First, we estimated separate random-
intercept models for the Harmony and the Conflict treatment. In
both models, we found significant effects of the own stated
intention on actual contributions, showing that subjects did stick to
their stated intentions. However, the effect sizes differ clearly
between the two conditions. This is supported by the significant
interaction effects between subjects’ own stated intention and the
condition dummy in for instance the ‘‘Final model’’.
In other words, subjects’ stated intentions were more reliable in
the Conflict than in Harmony condition. It remains an open
question what mechanism caused this effect. On the one hand, it
could be that in the Conflict treatment subjects took the statement
of their intentions more seriously, and thus adjusted their final
decisions less than subjects in the Harmony treatment. Alterna-
tively, subjects who were assigned to the Conflict conditions might
have felt more morally obliged to stick to their stated intention
when they made their decision [37].
Subjects were also influenced by the standardized messages that
they received from their group members. However, it turned out
that in both conditions subjects hardly considered the message that
contained the higher intention and were mainly influenced by the
lower intention. The former is demonstrated by the very weak and
insignificant effects of the stated intention of the group member
with the higher intention in the two separate models for Harmony
and Conflict in Table 6. The latter is supported by the stronger
and significant effects of the lower intention in the same models.
The effect of the lower intention was not significant in the
Harmony condition. However, in a model that does not include
the very weak and insignificant effect of the higher intention (not
reported), this effect is significant (z~1:90). In addition, the model
of Table 6 that includes interaction effects shows that the effect of
the lower intention of the two group members does not differ
significantly between Harmony and Conflict.
Finally, we included period effects in the models of Table 6 in
order to test whether the effects of intentions on contributions
changed over time, a dynamic that Figure 5 suggests. In general,
we did find significantly decreasing contributions [38]. However,
the model with the interaction effects demonstrates that the period
effects hardly differed between the Harmony and the Conflict
condition. Likelihood ratio tests revealed that including interaction
terms between the period-variable and the own intentions, the
higher intention of the group and the lower intention did not
increase model fit significantly. This demonstrates that the effects
that the intentions had on contributions did not change
significantly over time.
In a nutshell, analyses of the standardized messages revealed
that subjects tended to contribute more points when their group
members stated that they would contribute more. We found this
pattern in both conditions, concluding that subjects did prefer fair
payoff distributions amongst the members of their group.
However, subjects adjusted their contributions mainly in accor-
dance with the group member that stated the lower intention and,
actually, contributed on average even fewer points than stated by
the lower intention. This might explain why having the
opportunity to transmit standardized statements did not increase
contributions substantially.
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Analysis of the short messages. The analyses of the
previous section demonstrated that the statement of the intentions
did not increase contributions significantly, failing to support the
claim that the communication of intentions is the core process that
explains why communication increases engagement in intergroup
conflict. Thus, it remains an open question why intragroup
communication in terms of short-message communication in-
creased contributions and fueled intergroup conflict. In order to
explore which processes might explain this effect, we analyzed the
content of the short messages.
Obviously, short messages can contain a multitude of different
pieces of information and arguments that might motivate
individual contributions. In order to explore the content of the
messages and whether receiving messages with a specific content
affected subjects’ contributions, we asked three coders to
independently from each other evaluate each of the 480 short
messages that subjects had transmitted. This method is becoming a
standard approach to study the content of communication in
economic experiments [19,20,39,40]. We created a list of
mechanisms that existing contributions have proposed to explain
why communication motivates higher contributions [20,37,41,42].
Next, we formulated for each potential mechanism a coding
question that asked whether the content of a message indicated
that the mechanism might play a role (coded as 1) or not (coded as
0). Table 7 lists the mechanisms, and the respective coding tasks
and provides for each mechanism an example of a message where
all three coders answered the coding question with ‘‘yes’’. It turned
out that this method captured the content of most messages. In
total, for 76.46 percent of all messages at least one of the coding
questions was answered with ‘‘yes’’. 53 messages from the
Harmony treatment and 60 messages from the Conflict treatment
were always coded with ‘‘no’’. In Table 7, we also report the
Cronbach’s Alpha for each coding question, which demonstrates
that the inter-coder reliability was high.
For each message and each potential mechanism we calculated
the average rating across the three coders, arriving at outcome
measures that vary between zero and one. A value of zero is
adopted if none of the coders thought that the content of the
message indicates that the respective mechanism played a role.
The outcome measures adopt the value 1 if all three coders
consistently answered the coding question with ‘‘yes’’. Figure 6
provides an overview of the content of the messages, showing the
average of the outcome measures over all messages. The bars
depict the share of the messages that indicated that the respective
mechanisms might have played a role, weighted by the consistency
of the coder ratings. The sum of the bars can exceed the value of
one because messages can contain aspects of multiple mechanisms.
For instance, the message ‘‘I will contribute 10 again! I hope you
too’’ was coded by all three coders as a message that stated an
intention and formulated a norm. The figure shows that messages
Table 5. Effect of communication on contributions.
Dependent variable: Contribution
Empty model Main effects Full model
Fixed part




Standardized message 0.87 0.72
(0.59) (0.83)
Short message 3.05*** 3.07***
(0.59) (0.83)
Harmony | std. 0.31
message (1.17)
Harmony | short 20.03
message (1.17)
Random part
between subgroup 4.18 2.35 2.35
variance (0.94) (0.56) (0.56)
between subject 0.58 0.58 0.58
variance (0.17) (0.17) (0.17)
Residual variance 6.09 6.09 6.09
(0.24) (0.24) (0.24)
22 loglikelihood 6900. 85 6876.39 6876.29
Number of subjects 144 144 144
Number of decisions 1440 1440 1440
Standard errors in parentheses.
***significantly different from 0 at the 1 percent level (twosided Wald-test).
**significantly different from 0 at the 5 percent level (twosided Wald-test).
*significantly different from 0 at the 10 percent level (twosided Wald-test).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0097848.t005
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were mainly used to inform subgroup members about one’s
intentions and to articulate expectations about how much
everybody should contribute. In the Harmony condition, messages
frequently contained persuasive arguments and references to the
other group. Positive reinforcement was used more often in the
Harmony condition than in Conflict. What is more, Figure 6
shows that subjects hardly referred to a common subgroup identity
and hardly used verbal punishment. This fails to support that these
mechanisms caused the high contributions in the condition with
short-message communication.
Finally, we tested whether subjects’ contribution decisions were
affected by the content of the short messages that their subgroup
members had transmitted. Therefore, we calculated for each
contribution decision and each potential mechanism the average
rating of the two messages that the two subgroup members had
transmitted before the decision. These measures were entered as
Figure 4. Communication increased contributions in Harmony and Conflict.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0097848.g004
Figure 5. Actual contributions were lower than intentions stated in the standardized messages.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0097848.g005
Do Intergroup Conflicts Necessarily Result from Outgroup Hate?
PLOS ONE | www.plosone.org 14 June 2014 | Volume 9 | Issue 6 | e97848
independent variables in random-intercept models with contribu-
tions as dependent variable (see Table 8). Like in the previous
analyses, we controlled for the nestedness of decisions in subjects.
Model 1 replicates the finding that subjects contributed signifi-
cantly more points in the Harmony condition (see also the full
model in Table 5). In Model 2 we added the measures of the
messages’ content, which did not increase model fir significantly
according to the likelihood-ratio-test (p~0:26). Positive (negative)
effects indicate that subjects contributed more (fewer) points after
having received messages with the respective content. The table
shows that only messages that contained positive reinforcement
affected contributions significantly. To put it more precisely,
contributions were significantly higher when subjects received
messages that evaluated their past contributions positively. This
statistical effect turned out to be robust also when all insignificant
variables from Model 2 are excluded (see Model 3). A likelihood-
ratio-test showed that the fit of Model 3 was significantly better
than the fit of Model 1 (p~0:01). We also tested whether the
statistical effect of receiving positive reinforcement might have
been caused by the relationship with the opposite causal order
because it appears plausible that subjects who contribute many
points also tend to receive positively reinforcing messages more













Constant 5.13*** 0.01 0.88 20.07 0.38
(1.90) (0.94) (0.96) (1.15) (0.70)
Own intention 0.27*** 0.78*** 0.60*** 0.76*** 0.76***
(0.10) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.06)
Higher intention 0.00 0.04 0.11 0.06
group members (0.18) (0.11) (0.10) (0.12)
Lower intention 0.16 0.23*** 0.19*** 0.23*** 0.23***
group members (0.10) (0.05) (0.05) (0.06) (0. 04)
Period effect 20.21*** 20.23*** 20.22*** 20.23*** 20.22***
(0.06) (0.05) (0.04) (0.05) (0.04)
Harmony 0.00 4.68** 4.56***
condition (0.50) (2.07) (1.06)
Own intention 20.52*** 20.53***










betw. subgroup 2.22 0.01 0.71 1.04 0.99
variance (1.25) (0.28) (0.36) (0.51) (0.49)
between subject 0.20 0.93 0.26 0.59 0.61
variance (0.30) (0.48) (0.21) (0.28) (0.28)
Residual 6.16 4.26 5.67 5.20 5.21
variance (0.59) (0.41) (0.39) (0.35) (0.35)
22 loglikelihood 1141.96 1056.86 2233.27 2211.65 2212.10
Number of subjects 24 24 48 48 48
Number of decisions 240 240 480 480 480
Standard errors in parentheses.
***significantly different from 0 at the 1 percent level (twosided Wald-test).
**significantly different from 0 at the 5 percent level (twosided Wald-test).
*significantly different from 0 at the 10 percent level (twosided Wald-test).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0097848.t006
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frequently. In order to statistically control for this possibility, we
included in Model 4 the lagged dependent variable. Obviously,
when a lagged dependent variable is included, large parts of the
subject-level variance are captured by the effect of the lagged
variable. Presumably, this was the reason why MLwiN’s IGLS
algorithm failed to provide estimates for the subject-level variation.
We also estimated models based on MLwiN’s IGLS, and MCMC,
and Stata’s restricted maximum likelihood estimation, which did
provide estimates. All approaches lead to very similar results, both
in the random and in the fixed part of the model. Furthermore,
OLS models also resulted in very similar estimates. In Table 8, we
report MCMC estimates for Model 4 [43]. Strikingly, the effect of
receiving messages that contain positive reinforcement remained
significant, demonstrating that subjects who received such a
message increased their contributions.
In a nutshell, we found that subjects who received positive
feedback contributed significantly more points. On the one hand,
this suggests that positive reinforcement might explain the effect of








Statement of intentions Does the sender of the message
explicitly state how
many points he/she is
going to contribute?
‘‘I will contribute 10 points.’’ .709
Sending of norms Does the sender of the message state
how much he/she wants
the others to contribute?
‘‘I will contribute 10 points again.
I hope you’ll do the same.’’
.583
Persuasion Does the sender seek
to convince the others,
using an argument?
‘‘The best is to contribute everything,
also in order to see





mention the other group?
‘‘Nice. Our strategy begins to work out.
Keep it up, then Green
will have less.’’
.960
Loss aversion Does the sender raise concerns that
high contributions are the
only way to prevent losses?
‘‘We have to contribute the maximum.




Does sender complain about
low contributions of others?
‘‘Stealing 5 cents from us, person who
contributed 7 :P I will have to buy bread.’’
.798
Positive reinforcement Does the sender support
the others in their previous behavior?
‘‘Well done team :)










Figure 6. Content of the short messages in Conflict and Harmony.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0097848.g006
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communication on contributions. On the other hand, Figure 6
showed that subjects used positive reinforcement relatively rarely
in their messages. What is more, the statistical effect of receiving
positive feedback on contributions (see Table 8) is not large and
fails to explain the big difference in contributions between the
conditions without communication and communication in terms
of short messages (see Table 5). Indicating that positive reinforce-
ment fails to explain the strong effects of communication in terms
of short messages, the intercepts of Models 1 and 3 in Table 8 do
not differ significantly.
Strikingly, our explorative analysis did not provide evidence in
support of the remaining mechanisms. Even though subjects
frequently stated intentions, formulated norms, tried to persuade,
and referred to the other group, contribution decisions turned out
to be unaffected by these messages. However, this does not rule
out that some of the mechanisms played a considerable role. For
instance, it has been argued that group identities form uncon-
sciously [44], suggesting that communication in terms of short
messages might have created a group identity but group members
did not articulate this in their messages. Nevertheless, it is
questionable whether it is possible that mechanisms like persua-
sion, verbal punishment, and social norms can motivate contri-
butions without being manifest in the content of the short
messages. Another explanation for the limited effects could be that
subjects were not given identifiers that would have allowed them to
comment on the behavior of a specific member of their group.
Future studies should explore whether more sophisticated com-
munication is found when participants can address individual
group members easier than in our design.
Summary and Discussion
What have our studies taught us about social preferences and
intergroup conflict? First, Experiment 1 demonstrated that
intergroup settings do not necessarily generate negative social
preferences towards members of the outgroup and do not always
motivate individuals to harm outgroup members. This result is
consistent with findings from earlier game theoretic research [6,8],
but challenges a core assumption of social psychology’s minimal-
group paradigm [10,13], which claims that even a so called
‘‘minimal’’ (random) categorization of individuals suffices to create
the striving for increased differences between groups. Inspired by
this claim, we randomly assigned subjects to subgroups. However,
in addition we imposed that contributions to the public good of
one’s group harmed outgroup members, creating more than
‘‘minimal’’ group boundaries. Nevertheless, we did not find
support for negative social preferences towards outgroup members
or, in other words, outgroup hate.
To be sure, the lack of support for outgroup hate in our
experiments does not exclude that outgroup hate might play a
critical role in other intergroup settings and can motivate
contributions to conflict. However, our results show that
individuals may engage in intergroup conflict without feelings of
outgroup hate. This is an important finding because it can not be
explained with classical theories of intergroup relations [10,13,14].
These approaches to conflict focus on the conditions under which
individuals seek to harm outgroup members and neglect the fact
that conflict might be a mere byproduct of intragroup processes
that do not involve outgroup hate. Similarly, our results suggest
that intervention programs that seek to establish more harmonious
intergroup relations by reducing outgroup hate, such as the
famous ‘‘common ingroup identity model’’ [45], may have limited
effects when conflicts are not the result of outgroup hate.
Likewise, our results do not exclude that a minimal group
categorization might create ingroup love in the sense that subjects
have positive social preferences towards members of the ingroup,
an effect which found support in recent game theoretic exper-
iments [12]. Further support for the notion that mere categori-
zation can entail an ingroup bias was found in the first experiment.
In the Harmony condition, subjects contributed more when they
expected that their group members contribute many points. They
did not respond to expected contributions by outgroup members,
however. Future experimental research is needed to identify
conditions under which group categorization creates group biases,
as well as positive and negative social preferences towards in and
outgroups.
Our second experiment provided new support for the striking
claim that populations can suffer from intergroup conflict even
though individuals do not seek to harm outgroup members
because processes that act within subgroups motivate high
contributions and fuel intergroup conflicts [6]. In agreement with
earlier social psychological research [7,8], we found that subjects
contributed on average more than 90 percent of their endowment
when they could transmit short messages with their fellow group
members.
Extending earlier studies, we sought to identify the mechanism
that underlies this communication effect, trying to open the black
box of communication research that has been criticized earlier [5].
In particular, we tested whether within-subgroup communication
increases contributions to intergroup conflict because individuals
inform each other about their intentions and tend to stick to these
intentions, a mechanism that has recently been included in
rigorous models of strategic decision making [21,23,24]. Our
results do not provide support for this reasoning. In the
experimental conditions where subjects informed their group
members about their intentions, contributions were not signifi-
cantly higher than in the conditions without communication and
substantially smaller than in the conditions where subjects
transmitted short messages. We did find that contributions
reflected at least to some degree the intentions that subjects stated
and that contributions were influenced by the stated intentions of
fellow group members. However, subjects contributed fewer points
than they stated in their intention messages, sapping the proposed
effect of intention communication. In the experiment, statements
of intentions were cheap talk and contributing fewer points than
stated could not lead to any kind of punishment. It would,
therefore, be interesting to investigate contributions when stating
intentions implies costs in such a way that stating the intention to
contribute credibly signals cooperativeness.
In sum, it remains an open question why communication in
terms of short messages increased contributions and fueled
intergroup conflict. Our explorative analyses of the content of
messages provided some support for the argument that group
members tend to praise high contributions of group members and,
thus, provide selective social incentives to contribute. However,
statistical effects were rather small, suggesting that this mechanism
accounts only for parts of the communication effect. Nevertheless,
future research might take this finding as a starting point and
conduct an experiment where subjects can send standardized
feedback messages to their group members.
Identifying the mechanisms that cause communication effects is
an intricate problem, because multiple mechanisms might interact
and add up to the overall effect of communication. Nevertheless,
the apparent contradiction between the theoretical insight that
contributions to intergroup conflict are neither individually
rational nor collectively efficient, on the one hand, and the high
contributions that experimenters observed when subjects could
Do Intergroup Conflicts Necessarily Result from Outgroup Hate?
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communicate, on the other hand, makes it an important endeavor
for future research.
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